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Debt Relief for the Poorer Developing Countries
George C. Abbott*
Since August, 1982, when the Mexican debt crisis first hit the interna-
tional headlines, attention has been focused primarily on the problems
of the world's largest debtors. Very little has been written so far on the
debt problems of the poorer developing countries which, in fact, make up
the vast majority of the non-oil developing countries. This imbalance
suggests that either these countries do not have a debt problem, which is
clearly not the case, or their debts are of a lower international order. Or
to put it differently, some debts are more important than others, which is
an equally dubious proposition.
All foreign debts are a burden on the economy of the debtor coun-
try. In the case of the poorer developing countries, the size of the debt
belies its true burden. One assumes, for example, that because the debt is
quantitatively small in global terms, it is not a threat to world peace and
stability, or that it can be safely ignored while the international commu-
nity gets on with more important matters.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In recent years, the eco-
nomic performance and prospects of the poorer countries have deterio-
rated markedly. Growth rates are down, and exports have stagnated.
So, too, has the net inflow of resources. In many cases it has actually
become negative since debt service payments exteed net inflows of capital
for developmental purposes.' If nothing is done to address this problem,
it will obviously get worse. These countries will then find themselves
facing the awful dilemma of having to choose between debts and develop-
ment. For many of them that point has already been reached. The cur-
rent level of international indebtedness in the poorer developing
countries is thus a very real problem.2
* Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Economy, University of Glasgow, Scotland. For-
merly Chairman of the Center for Development Studies, University of Glasgow. Author of INTER-
NATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1979) and numerous articles on the
debt problem.
I See, Debt Problems of Developing Countries. Official Development Assistance and Related
Debt Service. Scope for Further Debt Relief in Favor of the Least Developed and Other Poorer Devel-
oping Countries, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva, Statistical Annex Doc.
TD/B/C.3/195 (December 14, 1984) [hereinafter Statistical Annex].
2 See Abbott, Debt and the Developed Countries, in 2 DEVELOPED POLICY REVIEW 181-9
(1984).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The purpose of this article is to try to reduce the imbalance which
has crept into the literature, by focusing on the debt problems of the
poorer developing countries. The article traces briefly the nature,
growth, and dimensions of foreign indebtedness and its effects on their
economic and social development. The article then discusses some of the
measures which have been taken to reduce poorer developing country
foreign debt levels. In particular, the contribution of Retroactive Terms
Adjustment (RTA), a package of measures which was devised and intro-
duced by the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1978 specifically for
the benefit of the poorer developing countries, is evaluated. Finally, the
article addresses the question of what next, and concludes that a major
new initiative is needed.
The Poorer Developing Countries
There are several ways of classifying the poorer developing coun-
tries. For purposes of this article, the term will be used to refer to those
countries with per capita incomes of under U.S.$1000. In 1980, a total of
77 countries fell into this category. These are shown in Table 1. Of
them, 51 countries located almost exclusively in Africa and Asia, had per
capita incomes of less than U.S.$500. Haiti is the only developing coun-
try in the Western Hemisphere in this category. Another category,
(identified by an L in Table 1), is the so-called least developed countries.
This group includes 36 countries, and contains the poorest of the poor as
well as some of the most populous countries in the world. It is also the
group which is generally targeted as being in urgent need of assistance
and for which special programs have been implemented.3
In terms of economic performance, the statistics for these countries
make depressing reading. Table 2 of the Statistical Annex of Document
shows that between 1980 and 1983, average growth rates for the least
developed countries fell by 0.1% per annum.4 Exports fell, on average,
by 8.2% per annum over the same period, while their terms of trade
deteriorated to the tune of 6.7% per annum. There were, of course, sig-
nificant variations in the performance of various regional and country
groupings. Countries in Africa did particularly badly. Their exports, for
example, fell on average, by 8.5% per annum, and their terms of trade by
8.0% per annum over the years in question.5
3 In 1981, for example, the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries held
in Paris adopted a substantial new program of action for the 1980's. For the full text of this pro-
gram, see, UNITED NATIONS THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, annex 125-57 (1985).
4 Id.
5 Statistical Annex, supra note 1, at 4 (Table 2).
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TABLE 1. LIST OF COUNTRIES WITH PER CAPITA GNP OF
UNDER $1,000 IN 1980
Afghanistan* (L)
Angola*
Bangladesh* (L)
Belize
Benin* (L)
Bhutan* (L)
Bolivia
Botswana (L)
Burkina Faso* (L)
Burma*
Burundi* (L)
Cape Verde* (L)
Cameroon
Central African
Republic* (L)
Chad* (L)
Comoros* (L)
Congo
Cuba
Democratic Kampuchea*
Democratic Yemen* (L)
Dominica
Djibouti* (L)
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea* (L)
Egypt
Ethiopia* (L)
Gambia* (L)
Ghana*
Guinea* (L)
Guinea-Bissau* (L)
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti* (L)
Honduras
India*
Indonesia*
Kenya*
Lao People's Demo-
cratic Republic* (L)
Lesotho* (L)
Liberia*
Madagascar*
Malawi* (L)
Maldives* (L)
Mali* (L)
Mauritania*
Morocco
Mozambique*
Nepal* (L)
Nicaragua
Niger* (L)
Nigeria
Pakistan*
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Rwanda*(L)
Samoa (L)
Sao Tome and Principe* (L)
Senegal*
Sierra Leone* (L)
Solomon Islands*
Somalia* (L)
Sri Lanka*
Saint Christopher and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Sudan* (L)
Swaziland
Thailand
Togo* (L)
Tonga*
Vanuatu
Yemen* (L)
Uganda* (L)
United Republic of
Tanzania* (L)
Zambia
Zaire*
Zimbabwe
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates a country with per capita income under $500, while (L) indicates a
least developed country.
Source: Statistical Annex, supra note I at 3.
Characteristics and Dimensions of Indebtness
It is against this steadily deteriorating picture that one must view
the recent rise in the group's foreign indebtedness. Data provided in Ta-
ble 2 shows that between 1980 and 1983, the total disbursed debts of the
poorer developing countries rose by 10.6% per annum, while Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA), the "true aid" element of total resource
flows, rose by 7.2% per annum. Total debt service payments increased,
on average, by 9.1% per annum. The corresponding figure for service
payments on ODA debts was 6.6% per annum. The effect of these move-
ments was to reduce the net inflow of ODA by some 14.5% over the
period 1980 to 1983.
There were variations within the overall picture but the story was
19871]
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generally the same. Net ODA flows declined by 14.5% per annum for
countries with per capita income of less than $1000. For those with per
capita incomes of less than $500, the annual fall was 16.6%. In terms of
the different regional groupings, the overall fall in percentage terms
ranged from 22.8% for countries in Asia with per capita incomes of less
than $500, to 10.5% for the same income group in Africa. A more de-
tailed analysis of total disbursed debts and debt service payments of the
poorer developing countries for 1975, and 1980 to 1983 is given in Table
2.
The first point to make about the data in Table 2 is that the dis-
bursed debts and debt service payments of the poorer developing coun-
tries account for less than one-third of the total debts and debt service
payments respectively, of the developing countries as a whole. Secondly,
they are spread over a large number of countries. In this respect the
picture differs markedly from that of the major debtor countries where
debts and debt service payments are heavily concentrated in about a
dozen countries. Thirdly, most of the debts of the poorer developing
countries are public sector debts, i.e., they are mainly "government to
government" debts. Qualitatively, therefore, they are easier to service.
About 70% of these debts are owed to the governments of the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). This is the conventional pic-
ture of these countries' indebtedness.
However, as Table 2 shows, their total indebtedness increased more
than threefold between 1975 and 1983. Most of this was accounted for
by non-concessional flows, which increased from $22 billion in 1975 to
$98 billion in 1983. In percentage terms, the proportion of non-conces-
sional flows increased from 36% to 51% in 1983. Consequently, non-
concessional flows are now the main source of resource flows to these
countries. The effect of this shift to borrowing on harder terms is re-
flected in the rising cost of servicing their debts. Total service payments
in fact rose from $6 billion in 1975 to $20 billion in 1983. The amount
due in respect of non-concessional lending amounted to $16 billion.
The conventional pattern of resource flows to these countries has
clearly changed in two important respects. First, net inflows of ODA
loans have fallen dramatically. Second, the shift to harder term loans has
resulted in a major upsurge in debt service payment. These are shown in
Table 2 as having risen from $6 billion in 1975 to $20.4 billion in 1983.
The impact of these developments on their economies was particularly
severe during the recent world recession. Total debts as a percentage of
GNP, for example, rose from 24% to 27% between 1980 and 1982 for
the group. In the case of the least developed countries, the proportion
reached 44% in 1982. In fact, all the main indicators show that the debt
problem deteriorated markedly during this period, and that compared
Vol. 19:1
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TABLE 2. TOTAL DISBURSED DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE
1975 AND 1980-1983
$ billion
1975 1980 1982 1983 a/
Developing countries with per capita GNP in 1980 of
under $1,000 b/
I. Total disbursed debt 61.7 143.7 175.5 194.2
By terms and source of lending:
Official development assistance 39.4 77.7 88.4 95.8
Bilateral 32.8 57.3 63.1
DAC 21.3 37.0 39.6 41.2
Miltilateral 6.6 20.4 25.4
Non-concessional 22.3 66.0 87.1 98.4
Export credits 9.8 28.5 34.6 37.6
Other official 4.8 15.3 21.4 23.7
Financial institutions 7.7 22.2 31.1 37.1
II. Debt service 6.0 15.7 20.9 20.4
of which: concessional 1.6 3.3 3.7 4.0
Memo items:
Developing countries with per capita GNP in 1980 of
under $500 c/
Total disbursed debt 41.7 83.8 98.6 107.8
of which: concessional 30.2 55.7 62.8 67.8
Total debt service 3.2 7.1 8.3 9.0
of which: concessional 1.1 2.2 2.4 2.5
Least developed countries d/
Total disbursed debt 7.3 21.4 26.2 28.6
of which: concessional 6.2 14.6 18.1 19.5
Total debt service 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.5
of which: concessional 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6
Major ODA recipients e/
Total disbursed debt 31.7 57.9 67.3 74.5
of which: concessional 24.7 41.6 44.0 48.7
Total debt service 2.4 5.7 7.8 7.6
of which: concessional 0.8 1.8 2.3 2.2
Source: UNCTAD secretariat estimates based on OECD, External Debt of Developing Countries,
1983 Survey, Paris, 1984; World Bank, Debtor Reporting System, in Statistical Annex, supra note 1 at
2 (as amended).
Note: Two dots (..) indicates that the data are not available.
a/ Estimates
b/ As listed in Table 1.
c/ Countries marked by an asterisk in Table 1.
d/ Countries followed by the letter L in Table 1.
e/ Egypt, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.
with 1975, the poorer developing countries were a lot worse off.6
The position is unlikely to improve in the medium term. Figures
6 Id., Table 3, at 5.
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from the OECD show that gross disbursements of bilateral ODA loans
from all sources are not increasing.7 Moreover by 1987, the poorer de-
veloping countries will face an accumulated debt of $44 billion on ODA
loans alone. 90% of this debt will be owed to the DAC countries, and in
terms of the distribution of debtors, 70% of it will be owed by countries
with annual per capita incomes of less than $500. A more pertinent sta-
tistic though, is that annual debt service payments will exceed $3 billion
in 1987. Between 1980 and 1982 they averaged $1.8 billion. In other
words, within the space of five years, annual service payments will have
risen by $1.2 billion.8
Another important statistic is that by 1987 interest payments on bi-
lateral ODA loans will exceed $1 billion annually, or about one-third of
the total debt service on ODA loans. Ten years ago, the equivalent pro-
portion was less than 10%. This rapid build-up in the current cost of
servicing their "cheap" loans is a good indication of the nature of the
debt problem facing the poorer developing countries. As the cost of bor-
rowing to service existing loans rises, the proportion of the outstanding
debt which actually gets repaid falls sharply, and with it any prospect of
them ever being able to repay their foreign debts. Poorer developing
countries are in fact locked into a situation of having to run faster each
year in order to remain in the same place.
Faced with this situation, poorer developing countries have been
forced to change their basic debt management strategy. Rather than at-
tempt to amortize their debts, they concentrate on rolling them over.9
This does not, of course, solve the problem. It simply pushes it into the
future, and increases the cost of finally amortizing the debt. By 1987,
they will need at least $1 billion in new money in order to prevent any
further deterioration in their external position. The conventional picture
has clearly broken down. It can no longer be assumed that the situation
will correct itself, or that the problem does not have serious long-term
implications for the stability and well-being of the international
economy.
Debt Relief Measures
Over the last decade or so there has been a fundamental change of
attitude on the part of the creditor countries regarding the debt problem.
They now accept that it is caused by a number of factors, some (if not
most) of which are beyond the control of the debtor countries. More to
7 Id., Table 4, at 6.
8 Id.
9 To roll over a debt is to pay only the current costs of servicing that debt (i.e., interest
charges).
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the point, they are more sympathetic to the plight of the debtor countries
and, equally, more receptive to the call for relief.
To this end, they have implemented a series of multilateral relief
operations. 10 It is not possible to discuss these in any detail in the space
of a short article, but three aspects are worth mentioning. First, the main
forms of debt consolidation have been rescheduling and refinancing.
More radical options like debt cancellation or default have not been
countenanced or encouraged. Second, consolidation has taken place
within a multilateral framework and dictated mainly by the creditors'
interests. Consequently, factors such as equity of treatment and burden-
sharing have played a decisive role in determining the amount of relief
granted. Third, debt relief has always been regarded as an ad hoc exer-
cise and has been accompanied by a variety of requirements and obliga-
tions on the debtor to return to solvency as quickly as possible.'
Although negotiations are conducted within a "multilateral frame-
work," they are not strictly speaking, multilateral. The creditor coun-
tries usually meet beforehand and agree on a common negotiating
position, including the terms and conditions to be imposed on the debtor
countries. The actual negotiations are conducted between the debtor
country on one side and the creditor countries as a group on the other.
There is very little scope for bilateral negotiations or deals with individ-
ual creditor countries. Whatever is offered, is sold as a package deal.
Also, multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank, are
not allowed to engage in debt rescheduling exercises. This excludes a
major proportion of the poorer countries' debt from consideration for
relief, given that these institutions are some of the largest providers of
funds to the poor countries. It also denies poorer countries the use of a
multilateral forum in which they can enhance their bargaining power as
well as exert some influence and leverage on the outcome. Under ex-
isting arrangements, the only leverage which they seem to have is that
debt relief is often the only realistic option to default. Ironically, this is
also one of the principal conditions which the creditors regard as a pre-
requisite for entering into debt relief negotiations.
The other pre-condition which creditor countries insist on, is that
debtors must implement an effective program of economic stabilization
measures which is supported by a stand-by agreement with the IMF."
This has, however, proved counter-productive in a number of instances.
Not only is upper tranche financing relatively "hard;" IMF debts cannot
10 For a good survey of recent relief operations, see INT'L MONETARY FUND Occasional Paper
25, Recent Multilateral Debt Restructurings with Official and Bank Credits (1983).
11 See, G. ABBOTT, INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch.
5 (1979).
12 INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 10, at ch. 4-5.
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be rescheduled. Consequently, many debtor countries have found them-
selves in a double-bind, and have to repeat the exercise in order to re-
cover lost ground. Indeed, another major irony of debt relief operations
is that it is very difficult to get on the bandwagon, but once you are on,
you are almost certainly assured of getting more than one ride.
Between 1975 and 1985, for example, a total of 144 debt relief agree-
ments were signed by 42 developing countries. Of these only 8 were sin-
gle negotiations. The rest were divided between 34 debtor countries.
Togo and Zaire topped the list with 7 agreements each, while Liberia,
Madagascar, Senegal and the Sudan each had 6. Not all of the other
countries listed in Table 1 had their debts renegotiated, but those that did
signed an average of 3 agreements over the period. 3 Most of these debts
have been renegotiated within the framework of the Paris Club.
The Paris Club
The Paris Club is an informal gathering of creditors which meets
from time to time to consider requests from debtor countries for relief on
their public guaranteed debts. It has no fixed membership nor insititu-
tional structure. As its name implies, the Club meets in Paris and its
meetings are usually chaired by a high-ranking official of the French
Treasury. It does not have any agreed upon procedures or written set of
rules. Rather, its procedures and practices have evolved over the last
thirty years. Each case is decided on its merits, and although the terms
of rescheduling may vary from case to case, the Club tries to apply prin-
ciples of equity, fairness and comparability of treatment as well as to
distribute the burden of relief equitable amongst its members. 4
Since the Paris Club started operations in 1956, both the number of
debtors seeking relief and the amount of debts consolidated have grown
steadily each year. During the 1970s, the number of debt reschedulings
averaged about three a year. Since 1983, the average has risen to over 16
a year. In 1985 alone, no less than 21 agreements, providing $18 billion
in debt relief, were concluded. Ten years earlier, the equivalent amount
of relief provided by the Paris Club barely exceeded $1 billion.15
Table 3 gives a summary of multilateral debt renegotiations con-
cluded between 1975 and 1985. These are broken down into two catego-
ries, namely, debts renegotiated under Paris Club arrangements, and
commercial bank debts. The latter category accounted for by far the
larger proportion of total debts renegotiated. This is due to the recent
debt crisis and the need to reschedule massive amounts of commercial
13 Multilateral Debt Renegotiations, 1975-85, 97 THE COURIER 88, (May-June 1986).
14 See generally, A. Rieffel, The Role of the Paris Club in Managing Debt Problems, in
PRINCETON ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SERIES 161 (1986).
15 INT'L MONETARY FUND News Survey 298 (Sept. 30, 1986).
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bank debts. In 1985, this reached a record level of $87 billion with an-
other $26 billion agreed in principle, but not completed in 1985.
As the figures show, the poorer developing countries account for a
very small proportion of the commercial debts which have been renegoti-
ated. The reason for this is well-known. As a group they are regarded as
a poor risk. Their credit-rating was not, in fact, high enough to enable
them to take advantage of all the surplus oil funds floating around. Con-
sequently, they were not as heavily indebted to the commercial banks as
the richer developing countries. The $6 billion exception in 1985 is made
up almost entirely of commercial bank loans renegotiated by the
Philippines.
As regards debts renegotiated within the Paris Club, the picture is
virtually the same. Although the amount of relief renegotiated has ex-
panded quite considerably in recent years, this can be attributed to the
effect of the debt crisis and the requests for relief of major debtors like
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Yugoslavia. In 1985, these four debtors
received relief totalling almost $4 billion under Paris Club arrangements.
The poorer developing countries have not shared in this expansion. The
amount of relief which they received remained more-or-less stable at $2
billion per annum between 1982 and 1985.16
Of the poorer developing countries, those with per capita incomes of
less than $1000 in 1980 fared the best. The 17 members of this group, all
of which are located in Africa, received virtually all the relief negotiated
by the poorer developing countries between 1975 and 1982. In subse-
quent years their share fluctuated, but it averages out at about half the
total. Although most observers would consider this pretty good going,
Chandra Hardy takes the view that:
The Paris Club mechanism has not been effective in easing Africa's
debt difficulties. The procedures adopted by the Paris Club place strict
limits on the definition of the debt eligible for debt relief. Conse-
quently, more than half of the debt service due is not considered eligi-
ble. Furthermore, relief is, when provided, on only a small part of the
remaining debt: and since the amount of relief is usually insufficient to
ease the liquidity problem for more than a year or two, this arrange-
ment has led to repeated rescheduling. 17
Retroactive Terms Adjustment
The poorer developing countries also received relief under Retroac-
tive Terms Adjustment (RTA), a program of measures introduced in
1978 specifically for their benefit. RTA arose out of a pledge given by the
developed countries at the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
16 Multilateral Debt Renegotiations, supra note 13.
17 Hardy, Africa's Debt Burden and Its Consequences, 97 THE COURIER 68 (May-June 1986).
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velopment in Nairobi, Kenya in 1976, to respond constructively to re-
quests for relief from the poorer developing countries experiencing debt
problems. The least developed and the most severely affected countries
were targeted as the two groups most in need of relief.18
The precise terms of this pledge were officially sanctioned and incor-
porated into a resolution of the Trade and Development Board in March,
1978 (The "Resolution").' 9 Inter alia, the Resolution called on the de-
veloped donor countries to adopt measures to readjust the terms of past
bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans to bring them
into line with current ODA terms, or to take other "equivalent meas-
ures" as a means of improving the net flow of official development assist-
ance.20 Under the terms of the Resolution, the donor countries were free
to decide who would benefit from relief, and what form this should take,
as well as the role of RTA in its own aid policy.2
When it was introduced, RTA was hailed as a major international
initiative to help the poorer developing countries to reduce the level of
their indebtedness and enhance their development prospects, by increas-
ing the net flow of resources. In other words, it was going to strike at the
root of the problem. Its principal provisions are therefore worth a close
look. Before RTA, the average grant element of ODA bilateral loans by
DAC countries was 89.3%. The grant element recommended under
RTA was 90%.22 The scope for retroactive adjustment of terms was
thus effectively limited to .7%, hardly -what one would call a major
breakthrough. This aspect of its operation was in fact largely symbolic.
RTA did, nevertheless, provide a major psychological boost for the
poorer developing countries. Until then, the creditor countries were
firmly against any form of debt relief, particularly cancellation of out-
standing obligations. They placed great store on the legal sanctity of
contracts and international obligations, and relief was given sparingly
and only in exceptional cases. RTA changed that. The developed coun-
tries were now prepared as a matter of policy to grant relief, including a
cancellation of debts owed by the two target groups. RTA was in fact a
euphemism for debt relief. A major battle had been won!
As implemented, RTA raised a number of questions. For example,
18 Resolution 94 (IV) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (May 31,
1976).
19 For the full text, see Resolution 165 (S-IX), Debt and Development Problems of Developing
Countries-Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Trade and Development Board at its Ninth
Special Session, 494th meeting, March 11, 1978.
20 Id., § A(4).
21 Id., § A(5) and B.
22 Monetary and Financial Issues: Review of Implementation and Further Action That May Be
Required Pursuant to Trade and Development Board Resolution 165 (X-IX) Part A, TD/234/Add:I
(May 15, 1979).
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the nature of "equivalent measures" was not defined. It was left to the
creditors to decide what exactly these measures were, and what forms
they would take in each case. In practice, they took the following forms:
(a) conversion of past ODA bilateral loans to grants; (b) cancellation of
past debts for a specific period of time; (c) waiving of interest payments;
(d) refinancing and/or rescheduling; and (e) conversion to local cost
and/or local currency payments.
TABLE 4. NOMINAL VALUE OF RTA MEASURES TAKEN
WITH RESPECT TO ODA DEBT
Nominal Value Nature of measures tak
Debt
cancellation
0.2
4.4
188.1
94.5
70.3
100.2
1772.6
71.4a
56.3a
159.0
3.5
247.3
69.2
692.2
3529.2
Waiving of
interest
payments
1.3
2.2
30.0
Refinancin
reschedulir
12.9
2.4
300.0
91.0
190.3
38.1
52.5
730.3
$US million
en
Conversion to
local cost aid or
g/ local currency
ng payments
1196.8
691.0
1887.8
0.3 0.3 0.3
Note: (a) including interest payments.
Source: TC/B (XXX) CRP.3, 25 March 1985, Debt and Development Problems of Poorer Developing
Countries and, in particular, of the Least Developed Countries: Review, Pursuant to Board Decision 289
(XXVIII), of the Implementation of Section A of Board Resolution 165 (S-IX). Table 1 p.4 (as amended).
Given the nature and diversity of each creditor's aid program, it is
virtually impossible to establish the equivalence of these measures vis a
vis each other not only within, but also between different donors' pro-
grams. It is difficult, therefore, to compare and quantify the relative
costs to respective creditors, or more importantly, the benefits to the re-
cipients. Further, the Resolution was couched in such a way as to in-
clude the widest possible country coverage while at the same time giving
donors flexibility in the choice of beneficiary countries. Consequently,
of which:
least
developed
.0
2.1
218.1
93.5
35.0
125.1
2072.5
66.8
56.3
192.9
104.4
13.5
240.5
691.0
3911.7
Total
0.2
5.7
15.1
220.5
94.5
70.3
125.1
2072.6
71.4
147.3
349.3
3.5
285.4
69.2
1941.5
691.0
6162.6
DAC members
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, Fed.
Rep. of
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Sweden
Switzerland
U.K.
U.S.A.
Total DAC
Non-DAC
Luxembourg
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there has been considerable variation regarding both the number and cat-
egory of beneficiary countries and the amount of relief granted.
The figures in Table 4 must therefore be read with some caution.
Notwithstanding, they show that the total value of debt relief granted
under RTA amounted to $6.2 billion. Of this, the least developed coun-
tries received $3.9 billion making them the main beneficiaries of the
scheme. West Germany was the principal contributor closely followed
by the United Kingdom. Between them, these two countries contributed
65% of all relief granted. The other creditors trailed a long way behind,
revealing some interesting inconsistences. For example, 50% of all bilat-
eral ODA loans owed to DAC countries are held by the United States.
However, the amount of relief granted was only $691 million, or 11.2%
of the total. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, with about 5% of
the debt, granted 32% of the relief.
Also, Table 4 shows that relief granted by the United States took the
form of local currency payments. This allowed the debtor countries to
service their debts in local currencies, thereby eliminating the so-called
transfer problem. It also enabled the United States government to build
up a local currency account which could then be used for any number of
purposes in the debtor country. The United Kingdom employed a rather
different technique. It provided the equivalent exchange of the local cost
of financing specific projects in foreign exchange. The two cannot really
be compared.
Debt cancellation, which includes the conversion of past loans to
grants, was the most popular measure taken. It accounted for 58% of
the value of all relief granted. The United States is the most significant
omission in this category. Apparently there are several procedural and
legislative difficulties which have to be overcome before the funds for
implementing RTA can be appropriated. Although the U.S. obtained
authority to undertake RTA on certain types of loans to benefit the least
developed countries on a case-by-case basis, Congress has not yet appro-
priated the funds to implement this authority. There is no evidence that
it is in a hurry to to do so.
In all, 58 poorer developing countries benefited from debt relief
granted under RTA. Most of them in fact received relief from more than
one creditor country. 3 However, not much is know about the basis on
which the beneficiary countries were selected, since the actual decision of
which countries to include (or exclude) was left entirely up to the credi-
tor countries. As a group, the least developed countries received the
most relief, mainly in the form of debt cancellation. "Other measures"
were reserved for the other beneficiaries.
Within this broad pattern there were several notable exceptions
23 Information provided by UNCTAD Secretariat, Geneva.
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from individual creditors' programs. West Germany and the United
Kingdom for example, took no action in favor of Ethiopia and Uganda,
two of the poorest of the least developed countries, principally on ac-
count of their violations of human rights. After the overthrow of Amin,
they changed their policy and Uganda was given debt relief. Disparity of
treatment appears to be even greater in respect of the most seriously af-
fected countries. France and West Germany appear to have taken no
action in favor of these countries, and in the case of the United States, no
information is available as to what action has been taken and which
countries benefited. All that is known is that local currency accounts
have been established in 9 countries. On the other hand, some of the
smaller creditor countries have gone beyond the strict remit of RTA and
extended relief, albeit on a selective basis, to other developing
countries.24
Thus, the concept of RTA seems to have been subject to a wide
range of interpretation and practices. These do not readily reduce them-
selves to a quantifiable measure, so it is not possible to compare and eval-
uate each donor's program properly. Within the limits of the data, some
countries like West Germany and the United Kingdom have done con-
siderably more to implement RTA than others. Among the latter, the
United States stands out. With the most debt owed to it, it seems to have
done the least to implement RTA. This is not only a strange inversion of
priorities, it makes nonsense of the donor's basic claim and requirement
for equity and fairness in sharing the burden of debt relief.
It is not easy, therefore, to say exactly what RTA has achieved. The
amount of relief granted is very small compared with the level of debts
outstanding, debt service payments or other standard criteria used for
assessing debt burdens. Looked at from the creditors' side, the amounts
involved are also insignificant in terms of their aid program. Conse-
quently, those DAC countries that considered RTA additional to current
aid disbursements (principally the smaller donors) were faced with a
marginal increase in commitments which was hardly enough to disrupt
their domestic economy. Other creditors simply accommodated the re-
lief under RTA within their current aid budgets, thereby eliminating any
additional budgetary costs or loss of resources.
A New Initiative is Needed
RTA has clearly not resulted in any major increase in the net flow of
resources to the poorer developing countries. Nor has RTA succeeded in
24 See Debt and Development Problems of Poorer Developing Countries and, in Particular of the
Least Developed Countries: Review Pursuant to Board Decision 289 (XXVIII) of the Implementation
of Section A of Board Resolution 165 (S-IX), Doc. TD/B (XXX) CRP.3, UNCTAD (March 25,
1985).
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reducing their current levels of international indebtedness. Whatever
gains were achieved have long since been whittled away by the increasing
cost of aid and the acute shortage of concessional aid funds. Levels of
indebtedness are now generally higher than they were from 1975 to 1977,
the period chosen as the base for RTA operations. There is an urgent
need for a new initiative not only to recapture lost ground but also to add
fresh momentum to the development process in these countries.
With a few notable exceptions, the developed countries do not ap-
pear to have committed themselves fully to RTA. The freedom and flexi-
bility of action which they reserved for themselves, have been used
mainly to restrict their activities and involvement in the scheme. Conse-
quently, the benefits of RTA have been kept to a minimum. Even when
taken at face value, $6.2 billion appears positively miserly when set
aloneside some of the huge amounts of debts which have been renegoti-
ated by some of the principal debtor countries.
Also, the creditor countries regard RTA as a limited exercise and
have strenously resisted calls to extend the scope of its activities and
range of benefits. Similarly, requests to convert it to an on-going process,
or at least to repeat the exercise, have not been entertained.25 However,
having accepted both the principle and practice of Multi-Year
Rescheduling Agreements (MYRA) with respect to debts owed by the
richer developing countries, creditor countries stand on RTA is inconsis-
tent and unsustainable. Further, it creates unnecessary international ill-
will and suspicion on the part of the poorer developing countries, who
regard the actions of the donor countries as a callous disregard for their
plight. There are, for example, more than sixty proposals presently of-
fered for reducing the debt problems of the richer developing countries. 26
This number of proposals is indicative of the widespread international
interest and desire to get to grips with this problem. However, there is
no comparable enthusiasm and commitment in respect of the debts of the
poorer developing countries.
The developed countries can, and must, do more to help poorer de-
veloping countries get their debts under control. The United States, be-
ing by far the largest single creditor, has a particular duty and
responsibility in this task. It is not enough to insist on legal rights and
entitlements. For the sums involved, such an approach seems unnecessa-
rily legalistic and "hard-nosed." More importantly, the United States is
losing a glorious opportunity to use its influence and leverage to secure
major economic, social and foreign policy objectives in this part of the
25 See Implementation of Trade and Development Board Resolution 165 (X-IX) on the Debt and
Development Problems of Developing Countries, Doc. TD/B/856, UNCTAD, (July 15, 1981).
26 Some of those are listed in D. LOMAX, THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT CRISIS 255-80
(1986).
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world. It already uses foreign aid as an arm of its foreign policy to the
developing countries. Debt relief is in fact the other side of this coin. If
it is politic to use foreign aid in this way, surely it is equally politic to use
debt relief to achieve the same ends.
Among other things, such a scheme would help to dispel the notion
that debt relief is a give-away or that the United States would suffer a loss
of resources, and end up rewarding the debtor's profligacy and domestic
economic mismanagement. It will also impose a cost in the beneficiary as
that debt relief would be tied to the achievement of specific reforms and
policy objectives. This would have the added advantage of integrating
debt relief into the debtors overall debt management strategy. At present
the two seem to have very little in common.
This argument has been fully developed elsewhere and need not be
repeated here.27 The main point is, that the United States and other
DAC creditor countries need to undertake a fundamental rethink of their
existing policy on debt relief to the poorer developing countries. At pres-
ent, debt relief is regarded as a last resort. No attempt is made, for exam-
ple, to relate it to performance criteria, or what is happening elsewhere in
the domestic economy or the wider context of the world economy. Ne-
gotiations are conducted in a crisis environment and each side is con-
cerned principally with what it can "get away with." Invariably, each
side comes away dissatisfied and suspicious of the other's motives. The
question which the creditors must now ask themselves is, "is it really
worth the hassle?"
With a more positive approach, creditor countries could achieve a
lot more. Instead of seeking to minimize their losses, they should capi-
talize on the real advantages which debt relief can contribute towards
improving international economic relations between the developed and
developing countries. Creditor countries could, for example, use debt re-
lief to breathe fresh life and direction into the so-called North-South dia-
logue, or to "clear the decks" of the massive backlog of outstanding
debts, and give the poorer countries a fresh start on the road to long-term
growth and development.
At present, the creditor countries seem to be getting the worst of all
possible worlds. Their ad hoc approach does not really reach the root of
the debt problem and is often counter-productive. Also, the amount of
relief is too little and too late. There is a story told of an American who
went into a saloon and ordered "whisky all round and a glass of water for
the Indian." Although, the story is probably apocryphal, it epitomizes
the view which many poorer developing countries hold about the way
their debt problems are regarded by the developed countries. It is a view
which urgently needs to be changed.
27 See G. ABBOTT supra note 9, at ch. 5-6.
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